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LANDLORD'S LIEN UNDER CHAPTER 143, ACTS 1932
LEGISLATURE.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

IN BANKRUPTCY.*

In the matter of
MiTT IRION, WILLIAM M. IRION

ALVx B. IRION, Partners
Trading and Doing Business
Under the Firm Name of MATT
AND

OPINION.

IRION & SONS,

BANKmuPT.
This matter is before me on petition of the Fidelity &
Columbia Trust Company, Trustee, and on petition of Max
Cohen and Louis Shapinsky, Trustees, &c., to review the action
of the Referee in entering the order of January 19, 1933, which,
in effect, held that Chapter 143 of the Acts of the 1932 General
Assembly of Kentucky, amending Sections 2316 and 2317 of
Kentucky Statutes, Carroll's 1930 Edition, applies to leases executed prior to the effective date of the amendatory Act. The
Amendatory Act cut down the landlord's superior lien for one
year's rent due and to become due, given such landlord by Sections 2316 and 2317 of Kentucky Statutes, to a lien for four
months' rent due and to become due, as to all landlords except
the landlord of a tenant farmer. The petitioners in this case do
not fall within the last mentioned class of landlords, as their
tenant, the bankrupts herein, were merchants.
I have approached the consideration of this case in a very
*This is one of a series of opinions of Circuit Judges and Federal
District Judges on questions of law many of which have not been
passed upon by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. This opinion by Judge
Chas. I. Dawson of the Federal Court for the Western District of Kentucky, interprets and discusses the constitutionality of Chap. 143 of
the 1932 Acts of the Kentucky Legislature. The Kentucky Law Journal
is indebted to Gavin H. Cochran, attorney of Louisville, for a copy of
the opinion.
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sympathetic frame of mind toward the ruling of the Referee, as
Section 2316 and 2317 of Kentucky Statutes have always
appeared to me to be an unreasonable statutory preference in
favor of the landlord; but a most thorough and exhaustive study
of the question satisfies me that the Referee's ruling is erroneous.
To apply the amendatory Act to leases executed prior to its
effective date necessarily gives it a retroactive effect, and it is
well settled that, with the exception of certain kinds of remedial
statutes, legislative acts will not be given a retroactive effect, unless from the context of the act itself such plainly appears to
have been the legislative intent. I can read no such intention
of the Legislature in the title or the body of the Act under consideration here. This of itself would seem to be conclusive of
the proposition presented on this review. However, another
insuperable obstacle to the application of this statute to preexisting leases is presented by Section 10, Article 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits any state from
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
A lease between a landlord and a tenant is undoubtedly a
contract within the meaning of this provision of the Federal
Constitution. Prior to the enactment of the amendatory Act
of 1932 every lease between landlord and tenant had impliedly
written into it the provisions of Sections 2316 and 2317 of Kentucky Statutes, giving to the landlord a superior lien on the personal property of the tenant located on the leased premises,
which was free of valid liens at the time it was placed upon the
leased premises. While it is true the landlord may lose his prior
lien upon failure to act within the time and in the manner prescribed by the two sections referred to, nevertheless the statutory lien is undoubtedly a substantive right in the landlord and
an integral part of his contract, protected against impairment
by subsequent legislation. This proposition is so thoroughly
settled by the cases that I do not deem citation of authority necessary.
The chief case relied upon by the Trustee to sustain the
ruling of the Referee is Loidsville Woolen Mills v. Johnson, 228
Fed. 606, from the Sixth Circuit. An examination of that case,
however, shows that it is clearly distinguishable from the one at
bar. That case involved the question of whether the repeal of
that part of Section 2487 Kentucky Statutes which gave to per-
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sons "who shall have furnished materials or supplies" for carrying on the business of manufacturing establishnent, and certain
other kinds of businesses, a lien on the assets of such business,
where there had been an assignment for the benefit of creditors
or other liquidation of the business for the benefit of creditors,
would affect the rights of such materialmen where the contract
to furnish the materials had been made before the effective date
of the repeal. The Circuit Court of Appeals simply held that
Section 2487, prior to the repeal, gave the materialman a lien
only to the extent of the materials furnished, and that therefore
the application of the repeal provision to supplies furnished after
the repeal, under a contract made prior to the repeal, could not
be considered either as retroactive legislation nor as legislation
impairing the obligation of contracts. The statute in that-case
gave the lien only to the extent of the materials furnished, not
for materials furnished and to be furnished under the contract.
Section 2316 and 2317 give the landlord a lien noti only for
accrued rent, but rent to become due in the future, to the extent
of twelve months' rent. The difference between the statute involved in the case referred to and the ones involved here makes
the reasoning in that case clearly inapplicable.
An order will be entered reversing the Referee, and directing him to enter an order sustaining the lien claims of the petitioners, to the extent of twelve months' rent due and to become
due, as provided in Sections 2316 and 2317 Kentucky Statutes.
CHAs. I. DAWSON,
Judge
April 3, 1933.

